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A MEMORIAL TO THURMAN WESLEY ARNOLD
RExD MILLm*
p
Thurman Wesley Arnold, Dean of the College of Law of
West Virginia University from 1927 to 1930, died at the age of 78
at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, on November 7, 1969. Thus
ended the remarkable career of one of the most colorful men the
New Deal brought to the nation in the 1930's.
Few men have packed so much living into a lifetime-lawyer,
judge, mayor, legislator, teacher, dean, economist, author, trust-
buster, defender of civil liberties, poet, raconteur-Arnold ranged
over a wide span of activity, leaving his mark on many phases of
American life.
Born in Laramie, Wyoming, June 2, 1891, the grandson of a
Presbyterian missionary and the son of a prosperous lawyer-
rancher, Arnold never lost his love for the rugged beauty of the
Wyoming ranch country where he was buried, high on top of a
hill on a cloudless November day. As his law partner, Paul A.
Porter, described Arnold's resting place in his remarks at the
memorial services at the Washington National Cathedral-"Thur-
man Arnold literally reposes on top of the world. And-as I shall
ever remember him-he always did."
This was the image of the man-always vigorous, always ac-
cepting the new challenge, always cheerful, full of wit and whimsy,
never depressed, a man of action whose wartime experiences in
chasing Pancho Villa across the Mexican border seemed to leave
him possessed of only one tactic and one command for living the
full life-"Chargel"
Judge Arnold, as he was always called after his tenure on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, was
*The author is a 1941 graduate of the West Virginia University College of
Law and was associated with Judge Arnold in the practice of law. He is currently
associated with Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.
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a graduate of Princeton and the Harvard Law School. In his auto-
biography, Fair Fights and Foul, Arnold reveals the beginnings of
what was to become a life-long running battle against the myths
of the law and of economics which became the subject of both his
incisive analysis and his ever present wit. Describing his law school
days at Harvard, Arnold reminisces about the mental process by
which the "legal mind" is developed:
Each individual endowed with free will by his creator had two
little men in the top of his head. One was called Reason, the
other Impulse. Reason was a highly reliable little man. Impulse
on the other hand, was completely unreliable and untrust-
worthy. He was unable to follow any logical and consistent
course of conduct. He was prone to be influenced by the
blandishments of demagogues. He was a pushover for unsound
schemes. It was, therefore, the duty and function of the little
man called Reason to put his foot squarely on the back of the
neck of Impulse whenever that individual began to err and
stray like a lost sheep, as was usually the case. The law was the
quintessence of human reason.
The result of this method of thinking I tried to express in
a poem written at the Harvard Law School in 1914 about a
typical law-school course:
CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICT OF LAWS with its peppery seasoning,
Of pliable, scarcely reliable reasoning,
Dealing with weird and impossible things,
Such as marriage and domicil, bastards and kings,
All about courts without jurisdiction,
Handing out misery, pain and affliction,
Making defendant, for reasons confusing,
Unfounded, ill-grounded, but always amusing,
Liable one place but not in another,
Son of his father, but not of his mother,
Married in Sweden, but only a lover in *
Pious dominions of Great Britain's sovereign.
Blithely upsetting all we've been taught,
Rendering futile our methods of thought,
Till Reason, tottering down from her throne,
And Common Sense, sitting, neglected, alone,
Cry out despairingly, 'Why do you hate us?
Give us once more our legitimate status.'
Ah, Students, bewildered, don't grasp at such straws,








Beale, Beale, wonderful Beale,*
Not even in verse can we tell how we feel,




For the law is a system of
wheels within wheels
Invented by Sayres and Thayers and Beales***
With each little wheel
So exactly adjusted,
That if it goes haywire
The whole thing is busted.
So Hail to Profanity,
Goodbye to Sanity,
Lost if you stop to consider or pause.
On with the frantic, romantic, pedantic,
Effusive, abusive, illusive, conclusive,
Evasive, persuasive, Conflict of Laws.
Arnold's battle with the myths of the legal profession continued
from his law school days throughout the years. Over fifty years
later he observed:
[L] egal learning is the art of making simple things complicated,
which should be an easy task for anyone. Paradoxically, the
great lawyer is frequently the one who can make simple and
intelligible matters which lawyers and judges regard as com-
plex.
2
** Joseph H. Beale was Professor of Conflict of Laws at Har-
vard at that time.
Sayre and Thayer were distinguished professors in the
Harvard Law School.'
'Arnold's pre-law experience at Princeton expresses a similar irreverence for
some of the "trappings" of formal education. His observation of college teaching
in the early 1900's indicates that either the students of today are little different
from those of yesteryear or that Arnold's early thinking was avant garde. Of
Princeton, Arnold says: "Particular studies were good for you and made you a
well-rounded man.... The one thing that had to be avoided at all costs was the
discussion of new ideas. Such an enterprise was useless because there were no
new ideas worth discussing. .. . I can recall no other professor (except E. S.
Corwin) during my stay in Princeton who said or did anything that had any
relevance to the development of the social institutions that existed outside the
college walls." T. Ai, NoLD, FAR FIGHITS AND FOUL, 17-18 (1965).
2 Id. at 252.
1970]
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After graduating from Harvard, a brief venture in private
practice in Chicago and service in World War I, Judge Arnold
returned to Laramie where he practiced law until 1927. During this
period he served as Mayor of Laramie and later, following a Repub-
lican sweep in 1920, as the only Democrat in the Wyoming House
of Representatives. His spirit is well caught by an amusing incident
which occurred during his tenure as a legislator. He tells the story
thus in Fair Fights and Foul:
On the fateful day the legislature assembled to elect a
speaker, there were a number of flowery speeches made for
the leading candidate. After they were over and the question was
about to be put to a vote, I rose and said, 'Mr. Speaker, the
Democratic party caucused last night, and when the name
of Thurman Arnold was mentioned, it threw its hat up in the
air and cheered for fifteen minutes. I therefore wish to put
his name in nomination for speaker of this House.' I then
sat down, but I got up immediately and seconded the nomina-
tion. I said, 'I have known Thurman Arnold for most of my
life, and I would trust him as far as I would myself.'
Everybody laughed except the Speaker pro tem. My nomin-
ation was not on his carefully prepared agenda, and he did
not know what to do. People were waving at him from all di-
rections. So I rose a third time, and said, 'Mr. Speaker, some
irresponsible Democrat has put my name in nomination and I
wish to withdraw it.' After that, the train got on the track
again.
In 1927, Judge Arnold left Laramie and the West to pursue his
teaching career and professional life in the East. The forces that
drove him from his native Wyoming were the same forces to
which he devoted a major portion of his legal skills and talents in
the years to follow. Absentee ownership and the growth of corporate
monopoly exerted economic strangulation upon the West and
Laramie. Arnold writes that in the 1920's the antitrust laws were
virtually suspended. Local lawyers were ignorant of them. "Res-
pectable and sound economists might have heard of the Sherman
Act", says Arnold, "but they did not believe in it." Local clients,
such as the motion picture theatre and the small oil refinery were
taken over by absentee corporate giants. The small town Western
lawyer was caught between the agricultural depression of the mid-
twenties and a growing monopoly economy.
[Vol. 72
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Leaving the troubled economy of the West, Arnold joined
the College of Law of West Virginia University as its dean for
three years. His contemporaries there described him as a "crusader
against false gods." He came to the University determined to
despel the notion that a law school dean must be a "stuffed shirt"
-a task in which it is said he quickly succeeded. Though little is
recorded of his tenure at West Virginia, he is remembered in the
minds and hearts of his colleagues and former students at the
College of Law. It is recalled that his successor, Dean T. Porter
Hardman, always referred to Dean Arnold as the most "unfor-
gettable character" he had ever met. It is also said that he
instituted innovative techniques and a fresh approach to the
classroom dialogue between professor and scholar. His keen in-
terest in economics brought a practical insight to otherwise pedantic
legal subjects. For Arnold, above all, was a practical, "can-do'
lawyer. His ability to cut quickly through large masses of facts
and complicated circumstances to the heart of the legal problem
was one of his greatest talents. In the process, the cliches, the myths,
the facades of both law and economics were hacked away. He was
the expert in making "simple and intelligible" those matters "which
lawyers and judges regard as complex"-his own definition, of the
"great lawyer." And young lawyers who learned from him were
taught that it was the lawyer's duty not only to protect his client
from running afoul of the law, but affirmatively to seek ways in
which the dient's interest could best be served and his objectives
best accomplished-a task not necessarily suited to the logical legal
mind, but rather to the imaginative legal mind such as Arnold
possessed.
In 1930, Judge Arnold left West Virginia to accept a position
on the law faculty at Yale. There he joined William 0. Douglas,
now Justice of the Supreme Court, Walton Hamilton, a lawyer-
economist who had headed the Brookings Institution, Arthur
Corbin, the contracts expert, Dean Charles E. Clark and others
in an exciting teaching career which lasted until 1938. At the
memorial services for Judge Arnold after his death, Justice Douglas
recalled Arnold at Yale as a man who was "constantly at war with
orthodoxy". It was during this period of his career that Arnold
wrote two books, The Folklore of Capitalism and Bottlenecks of
Business, legal-economic treatises striking out at what he saw as the
myths of capitalism and the dangers of restraints upon free com-
1970]
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petition. Folklore of Capitalism became a best seller and soon
brought Arnold national attention.
The New Deal under President Roosevelt had sought to over-
come the depression of the early 1930's by government-industry
cooperative efforts through the NRA Codes. When the Supreme
Court held the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional
in 19353 the President turned to other means to control concentra-
tion of economic wealth and power.
Arnold, who had seen government service with the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission during several summers while on the Yale
faculty, was appointed by President Roosevelt in 1938 as Assistant
Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice. Thus began the reincarnation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts and the most vigorous and sweeping
prosecution of the antitrust laws that the nation had ever seen. In
five years, he instituted 230 suits designed to strike down monopoly
practices, restraints of trade and price fixing. Actions were brought
against virtually every major facet of American business-the oil
companies, the glass industry, the railroad industry, the Associated
Press, the American Medical Association, and the labor unions.
4
Over 1000 businessmen were placed under criminal indictment.
Arnold describes the resulting consternation in Fair Fights and
Foul, at 114, thus:
As indictments of respectable people began to pour out
from the Justice Department in unprecedented numbers, cries
of outrage could be heard from coast to coast. I was pictured
as a wild man whose sanity was in considerable doubt. One
major newspaper referred to me as 'an idiot in a powder mill.'
Letters of protest poured into the White House.
Undaunted, Arnold pursued his prosecutions with customary
vigor. Over half of all the antitrust actions brought during the then
50 year history of the Sherman Act were instituted during Arnold's
"trust-busting" career as Assistant Attorney General-and almost
every major case was successful, with the notable exception of the
3 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Hartford-Em-
pire Co., v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States, v. Pullman Co., 330
U.S. 806 (1946); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United
States v. American Medical Assn., 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. den. 308
U.S. 599 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
[Vol. 208
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field of labor-union activity where Arnold sought to prove that
certain labor practices exceeded labor's exemption from the Sher-
man Act accorded it by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.5
When restraints upon big business began to conflict with war
production efforts after Pearl Harbor, Arnold was appointed by
President Roosevelt to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, a post which he held for a brief
time from 1943 until 1945. But the bench was too quiet for Arnold,
the advocate. As his friend George Wharton Pepper once said of
him, he would "rather make his living talking to a bunch of damn
fools, than listening to a bunch of damn fools." His innate sense
of humor nevertheless helped prevent life on the bench from be-
coming too dull. His wit shone through his opinions. In Esquire, Inc.
v. Walker, Postmaster General,6 Judge Arnold struck down a ruling
by the Postmaster General which revoked Esquire Magazine's second-
class mailing privilege, not because the magazine was obscene but
because the writings and pictures were in a borderland zone of
material "morally improper and not for the public welfare and the
public good." After setting out verbatim lengthy and amusing por-
tions of the transcript to demonstrate the confusion caused by "the
age old question when a scantily clad lady is art, and when she is
highly improper," Judge Arnold concluded his opinion with
this token of solace for thd Post Office Department:
We believe that the Post Office officials should experience a
feeling of relief if they are limited to the more prosaic function
of seeing to it that "neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of
night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their
appointed rounds."
Reversed and Remanded.7
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
"Id. at 55. In later years, while in private practice, Arnold was again at war
with the laws of obscenity. In one suit, he defended Playboy magazine against
obscenity charges in the staid Supreme Court of Vermont. His brief shocked
the Attorney General of Vermont who took particular exception to a footnote
which suggested that the only way for the Court to avoid using language to
describe the pictures more repellent than the pictures themselves was to hold
that "no nudes is good nudes." As Arnold's brief observed:
"The spectacle of a judge poring over the picture of some nude trying to
ascertain the extent to which she arouses prurient interests, and then at-
tempting to write an opinion which explains the difference between that
nude and some other nude has elements of low comedy. Justice is supposed
to be a blind Goddess. The task of explaining why the words 'sexual rela-
tions' are decent and some other word with the same meaning is indecent
is not one for which judicial techniques are adapted."
1970]
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In 1945 Arnold left the bench for the private practice of law
in Washington, D.C. He was soon joined by Abe Fortas, who had
just left his post as Under Secretary of the Interior, and Paul
Porter, the former head of the Office of Price Administration and
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. From six
lawyers, the firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter grew steadily over the
years. At his death, the law firm which he created, now Arnold &
Porter, had some 70 lawyers on its staff.
Arnold pursued his role as an advocate in private practice
with the same zest that had characterized his service as a trust-
buster. But now both sides of the coin felt his impact. For he was as
effective in counseling the large corporation as to its rights in ef-
fecting a merger as in representing the plaintiff in a treble damage
action. He was soon immersed in antitrust litigation and loved
nothing more than the courtroom battle and appellate argument.
Though his roster of corporate clients and cases grew, he also
became deeply involved in defending the civil rights of those who
were subjected to the star chamber tactics which characterized the
McCarthy Era. He never shirked the unpopular cause if an im-
portant civil right was in jeopardy. Thus, when Dorothy Bailey,
a civil servant, was charged with disloyalty but denied the right to
examine the secret file that was used against her by the government,
Arnold carried the case to the Supreme Court.8 In the Peters case, D
Arnold placed before the Court the plight of a Yale medical pro-
fessor and special consultant to the Public Health Service, who had
been denied the right to confront his accusers.
In 1958, Judge Arnold rose to the defense of the noted poet,
Ezra Pound, in a proceeding which demonstrated the flexibility of
justice to adapt to conflicting political, legal and moral values.
Pound was indicted for treason in 1945 because of his considerably
deluded broadcasts during the war for the Italian government at-
tacking the entry of the United States into the conflict as a con-
spiracy between President Roosevelt and the Jews. A board of
psychiatrists found Pound mentally unfit to stand trial. Thus, he
languished in the criminal ward of an institution for the insane for
some thirteen years to the dismay and consternation of the literary
IBailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afj'd per curiam 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
'Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
[Vol. 72
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world. During his confinement, he won a distinguished prize, a-
warded by the Library of Congress, for a new collection of poetry.
Though it became obvious that the Department of Justice had no
desire to prosecute Pound at his advanced age of 72, it could not,
with political grace, dismiss the indictment against an alleged war-
time traitor and anti-Semite. At the request of the noted poet,
Robert Frost, who was supported in his efforts by Ernest Hemingway,
Carl Sandburg and other eminent literary figures, Judge Arnold
moved to dismiss the indictment-not on any legal grounds be-
cause there were none-but only because it was ridiculous to per-
mit the insane Pound, who was nevertheless harmless, to die in an
asylum. When the motion was presented in court, the Department
of Justice did not object. The court, however, troubled by the fail-
ure of the prosecution to move to dismiss, asked if it would con-
sent. Government counsel consented, whereupon the Court granted
the motion which had thus become a back-handed motion to dismiss
by the prosecution. The law bent, justice was done and the aged
poet left the courtroom to go home with his wife.
In 1955, Arnold won perhaps his greatest victory in the civil
rights field when he obtained a dismissal of the indictment of Johns
Hopkins professor Owen Lattimore, the China expert, who was
charged with perjury in denying Communist links in testimony
before the "McCarthy Committee."10 The New York Times'
obituary of Judge Arnold points out that he regarded Congres-
sional loyalty investigations as intrusions on free speech. "Once
you admit as a debatable question that the investigation is instituted
to expose the views and associations of individuals to the public,"
said Arnold, "you have lost the cause of free speech."
But the law student who reads this article should not be misled
in believing that Arnold's defense of civil rights was limited to the
poor, the oppressed or those who were wrongfully pilloried upon
untested allegations of disloyalty. Arnold's concern for the pro-
tection of legal rights was all encompassing as it must be. The
rights of a large, corporate business were to be as jealously guard-
ed as were those of a civil servant or college professor. Thus, in
June of 1969, a few short months before his death, a professor of
chemistry and molecular bio-physics at Yale wrote Arnold that, in
"' For an intriguing account of this litigation, seen through the eyes of
the defendant, see 0. LATnmom, OREAL BY SLANDER, (1950).
1970]
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view of the health hazards of smoking, he found it "shocking" that
the firm of Arnold and Porter would represent the tobacco in-
dustry. The professor concluded his letter with the observation
that he saw "little hope for achieving a decent society in this
country as long as clever lawyers will do anything for money."
Arnold's reply lectured the Professor on the constitutional right
to counsel with his usual touch of humor. The reply is quoted
in part below:
Dear Professor
I was myself a professor at Yale for eight happy years. I
know from experience some of the consequences when a pro-
fessor gives up hope for a decent society. He becomes morose
and irritable. He exhibits a tendency to thumb his nose at
people with whom he disagrees under the delusion that this
will put them in their place and make them ashamed of them-
selves. His point of view becomes narrow and even may effect
his teaching. I feel, therefore, an obligation to Yale to give
you such mental therapy as I can; hence this letter.
One of the great achievements of American constitutional
law is the fact that every litigant either before a court or be-
fore Congress is entitled to be represented by an attorney. The
duty of an attorney is not towards society but towards his
client. An attorney is not ethically permitted when presenting
his client's case to give his own opinion as to the merits. His
duty is solely to make the best presentation he can. The to-
bacco companies are as much entitled to representation by
counsel as the lowest criminal is. The duty of an attorney is to
act as an advocate, not as a judge. The theory of American con-
stitutional law is that better results are obtained from a system
which requires each side to be represented by counsel of his own
choice. When he is too ignorant to make that choice an at-
torney is appointed by the court.
Your position seems to be that a litigant has no moral
right to adequate representation by counsel if he represents a
cause in which you do not believe. That idea has been repudi-
ated in American constitutional law. The great advance made
by the Warren Court has been to insure adequate representation
for the poor as well as for the rich, for the guilty as well as for
the innocent.
Whatever be the ultimate solution of the cigarette pro-
blem it will not be furthered by establishing the principle that
in any sort of legal controversy either side should be deprived
of the services of the best counsel he can obtain. Your idea is
[Vol. 72
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a dangerous doctrine. Once established, it will sap the very
foundations of the American ideal of a fair trial.
Letters like yours which attack the theory of adequate
representation by counsel on both sides without judgment as
to the merits represent a dangerous tendency which reached its
height in the McCarthy era when even University presidents
refused to support professors in their right to a fair hearing.
I doubt very much if this letter has any therapeutic effect
in curing you of your present abandonment of 'hope for
achieving a decent society' if a tobacco company is given the
right to be represented by counsel. Nevertheless, it is the best
I can do. I suggest that you read it over at least twice, then
take a couple of aspirins and see if that doesn't make you feel
better about the role of a fair trial in American jurisprudence.
Sincerely,
Thurman Arnold"
And so he remained the vigilant advocate to the end, blessed
with the retention of his keen mind and sharp sense of humor. As
Abe Fortas, his former law partner, described him at the memorial
services in his honor, Arnold was "a man of the law, a warm,
vibrant, open man, perhaps the last of freedom's great fighters."
"Arnold's penchant for whimsy touched his personal correspondence at
every turn. A good example is his reply to a friend, John S;. Miller, a Chicago
lawyer who asked Arnold to move the admission of his partner to the Bar
of the Supreme Court:
Dear John:
Your letter has just the proper touch of humility and recognition of
merit which is adequate to induce me to undertake the hazardous enter-
prise of moving the admission of your partner to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Hitherto I have had an almost unprecedented success
in inducing the Court to grant the admission of those whom I have under-
taken the responsibility of sponsoring. It may be that this has been just
a matter of luck but my friends all tell me that it proves that the
Court has unbounded faith in my judgement as to who should be and who
should not be admitted to that select little coterie known as the Supreme
Court Bar. I would therefore have reasonable anticipation of success, which
is illustrated by the betting odds in the office which are 8-to-5 that I
get your partner in.
However, I think we should take no chances with a matter as im-
portant as this. Will you, therefore, ask your partner meticulously to ob-
serve the following instructions:
(I) He should wear a full dress suit, white tie, and a large chrysan-
themum in his buttonhole. This will single him out from the less ima-
ginative applicants.
(2) It is important, and I wish you would particularly emphasize this,
that he appear in a reasonable state of sobriety. This business of having to
prop up the applicants for admission whom I introduce so that they will
1970]
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Yes, the old fighter is dead. But we may not have heard the last
from him. In a recent sermon, Dr. George M. Docherty, Pastor of
the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church in Washington, D.C.,
made the point that when Christ chased the money changers from
the temple it was not because they were conducting business on
holy grounds but rather because they had a monopoly on sacrifi-
cial doves and were exacting therefor an exorbitant price. With
this kind of thinking in the High Court in whose jurisdiction
Arnold now resides, those who knew Arnold would not be sur-
prised to learn of the adoption of an Eleventh Commandment read-
ing "Thou Shalt Not Restrain Competition". If such a Holy Writ
should issue, the stone tablet upon which it is carved may well bear
the legend in the lower left corner: "Of counsel, Thurman Arnold."
not fall flat on their faces while I am making my opening statement is
quite unnerving.
(3) While not absolutely required I think it would be helpful if he
carried with him a large American flag and have a copy of the Chicago
Tribune sticking out of his pocket in order to rebut any inference that he
is a Communist.
Tell Mr. Overton to drop by the office about 11:00 o'clock on Monday,
October 22nd, and we will go over to the Court.
Affectionately,
Thurman Arnold
SELECTIONS FOM THE LETTERS AND LEGAL PAPERS oF THURMAN ARNOLD, (1961).
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